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THE MAZE OF TASTE: ON BATAILLE, DERRIDA,
AND KANT
A rkady Plotnitsky
University of Pennsylvania

If Bataille's confrontation with Hegel can be seen as central to
his thought and writing and has become a relative commonplace
(albeit a productive one), Bataille's references to Kant are only
casual. I shall not, however, argue the significance of Kant in
Bataille's discourse in specific (let alone textual) terms. Rather, I
want to explore what can be seen as a Kantian moment in Bataille, as
it appears within the historical and conceptual closure that, according to Derrida, defines Western philosophical discourse, or
theoretical discourse, or even discourse in general. Indeed it is far
from self-evident that this closure can be subsumed under the rubric of
the Occident, however convenient or comfortable that demarcation
might appear.
That Kant influenced Bataille is best illustrated by Bataille himself in a passing remark in "The 'Old Mole' and the Prefix Sur in the
words Surhomme [ Superman] and Surrealist": ". . . it was necess ary to endow antinomies in general with a mechanical and abstract
character, as in Kant and Hegel."' This coupling of Kant and Hegel is
familiar to the point of triviality. It is far less trivial and far more significant, however, that this coupling and this unity are, to a considerable degree, conceived of by Bataille in terms of a historical and
conceptual closure of metaphysics, the closure on which our discourse must depend, even when it is aimed at undermining the power
of metaphysics and philosophy. 2 The concept of closure, furthermore, includes a crucial idea of the necessity-psychological, social,
cultural, historical, perhaps even political-of metaphysical thinking. Indeed, the phrase immediately preceding the one just cited
defines the philosophical closure of language: ". . . for human
vocabulary continues everywhere to maintain throughout a faithful
memory of fundamental categories" (Visions, p. 35).
199
Published by New Prairie Press

1

200

Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 5
STCL, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer, 1988)

With the exception of Derrida's seminal formulations, one can
hardly think of a better invocation of closure: however much
"philosophical usages are in question" ( Visions, p. 35) and however
transformed they might become, the metaphysical remnants,
including those left by the history of this questioning, are ineluctable
in our language. It is this configuration that is powerfully explored by
Derrida. The notion of closure, so conceived, is perhaps Derrida's
most significant contribution to modern theoretical thought and to
intellectual history in general.
It is of course true that the very concept (or category) of category
is itself a Kantian, as well as an Aristotelian one. The closure begins
neither with Kant (nor Aristotle, nor anyone else), nor does it end with
Hegel, Bataille, or Derrida. The title of Bataille's essay (accompanied by its epigraph from Marx, metaphorically defining historical
materialism: "In history as in nature decay is the laboratory of life"
[Visions, p. 32]) announces this closure and the proper names that
demarcate it in more recent historical terms: Marx, Nietzsche, Freud
and several others as well. In doing so, Bataille's text inscribes "the
historical and theoretical situation that is also our own" (Positions, p. 51), simultaneously framing it-inscribing its "parergonbetween the communist and surrealist manifestos."'
These later parergonal structures still await an analysis at the
level that their complexity and richness demand, whether we view
them in a general context or see the locus of Bataille's discourse
between Breton and Aragon-in, as it were, the Breton/Aragon parergon. It is not that this context or (for it can hardly be subsumed under
the rubric of context), this configuration, can exhaust the parergon of
Bataille's discourse. It can only provisionally open it. The parergon
defining Bataille's discourse or, as Derrida persuasively argues, any
parergon can neither be exhausted nor saturated. It can be neither
uniquely originated, nor unequivocally closed. This is why these
parergonal effects cannot be subsumed under the rubric of context,
particularly conscious context.4 One of my goals in this essay will be
to follow the complexity of the parergonal in the context (that is to say,
parergon) of Bataille's discourse, specifically in relation to the question of general economy and of the major form of writing opened by
B ataille.
Undoubtedly, the shadow of Hegel looms large over all this,
whether in Marx, Bataille, Derrida or in general. But Kant's shadow
no less so. For, if "Hegel is always right as soon as one opens one's
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol12/iss2/5
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mouth in order to articulate meaning," he cannot be right without
Kant. s It is this Kantian margin (or center) that I want to explore,
borrowing in part my title from Bataille's "The Labyrinth." This
proximity of closure might, along the way, also suggest a certain
textual proximity on which I shall not insist but which cannot be
ignored either.
There will be a further specificity, for my theme will be a very
small but extraordinarily interesting and important portion of Kant's
third critique. As in Bataille's essay cited earlier, the question of the
philosophical will be situated in Kant between the question of the
aesthetic (analogous to surrealism in Bataille) and the political. It is
this "left" artistic margin that will be my major concern in this essay.
As Bataille's "sur" suggests, this "margin"-that is, what is
marginalized and minimized within the text of philosophy-will, in
the power of its efficacy, exceed the "center" and will thus be reinscribed as the condition of the possibility of the center. Kant already
knew (or was afraid to know) that, suppressing the excess of knowledge that makes knowledge (i.e. philosophy) possible in the first
place. My major concern however will be what Bataille manages to do
with this "knowledge," for, as Derrida says, "We know this . only
now, and with a knowledge that is not a knowledge at all."6 This is
what Bataille had in mind or what we would do best to infer from his
concept of un-knowledge.
In establishing his division and, a bit later, his hierarchy of the
beautiful arts, Kant writes of the arts of speech (of which poetry will
be then specifically assigned "the first rank"):
.

.

The orator, then, promises a serious business, and in order
to entertain his audience conducts it as if it were a mere play with
ideas. The poet merely promises an entertaining play with ideas,
and yet it has the same effect upon the understanding as if he had
only intended to carry on its business. The combination and
harmony of both cognitive faculties, sensibility and understanding, which cannot dispense with each other but which yet cannot
well be united without constraint and mutual prejudice, must
appear to be undesigned and so to be brought about by themselves; otherwise it is not beautiful art. Hence, all that is studied
and anxious must be avoided in it, for beautiful art must be free
art in a double sense. It is not a work like a mercenary employment, the greatness of which can be judged according to a

Published by New Prairie Press

3

202

Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 5
STCL, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer, 1988)

definite standard, which can be attained or paid for, and again,
though the mind is here occupied, it feels itself thus contented and
aroused without looking to any other purpose (independent of
reward).
The orator therefore gives something which he does not
promise, viz. an entertaining play of the imagination; but he also
fails to supply what he did promise, which is indeed his
announced business, viz. the purposive occupation of the understanding. On the other hand, the poet promises little and
announces a mere play with ideas; but he supplies something
which is worth occupying ourselves with, because he provides in
this play food for the understanding and, by the aid of imagination, gives life to his concepts. (Thus the orator on the whole
gives less, the poet more, than he promises).'

It might seem astonishing, but also, given the structure of closure as delineated earlier, rather natural or logical, how much of
Bataille's problematics is inscribed in this and surrounding passages
in Kant. Given the transformations of the concepts of text and history
enacted by the recent transformations of the theoretical field itself,
including those in Bataille's text, one hesitates to use the word
"anticipated." These transformations, specifically those inscribed in
Bataille's text, affect our conception of what constitutes the
theoretical field and how it is constituted as much as they affect the
concepts of text and history.
There is, to begin with, the question of "economy" in its most
conventional sense, the economic question raised by Kant's conception of beautiful art as free art (in the first sense). One might and
indeed must see it as the question of political economy as well: it
is hardly useful-"economical" or "productive"-to speak of an
economy that would not be political in the context of Bataille, even as
Bataille subjects the science of political economy and its concepts to a
radical critique as a restricted economy. It is a far more complex question whether, while retaining the significance of the political and, at
the same time, inscribing the general economy as an economy of
waste and expenditure, Bataille avoids a certain idealization of waste
as against consumption accounted for by a restricted economy. The
latter in Bataille manifests itself precisely at the level of the classical
science of political economy.
Beautiful art, then, "is not a work like a mercenary employment,
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the greatness of which can be judged according to a definite standard,
which can be attained or paid for" (p. 165). Derrida was perhaps the
first to draw attention to these "economic" connections in Kant in
"Economimesis," expanding the general concept of economy as
grounding the question of genius in its relation to the question of imitation. The imitative work of genius (with respect to Nature) is an imitation, mimesis, of economy as process, play of forces and so oneconomimesis-not an imitation of the product. Genius in its creation, in its production, imitates how Nature (or God) produces, not
what is produced. Economic metaphors, including those of political
economics, still permeate the philosophical account, the science of
this "economy," expanded by Kant from a difference between beautiful art and a material ("hard") economic process, "a work like a mercenary employment," to a difference ( still economic) in the occupation of the mind. Kant's "and again" is most telling in this respect:
"And again, though the mind is here occupied [employed], it feels
itself thus contented and aroused without looking to any other purpose (independently of reward)" (p. 165).
Kant's borrowing, both negative and positive, of the economic
inscriptions does not in itself constitute a problem, particularly if considered in the context of Bataille's discourse. First of all, the discourse of political economy might itself be seen, historically speaking,
as borrowing from Kant in this respect, though it would be silly to see
Kant's in turn as an original discourse in this sense. Kant must have
borrowed his "mercenary" metaphors from some forms of economic
and political economic discourse. There can be an original metaphor
here no more than anywhere else. Second, the history of theory from
Kant to Marx, Nietzsche, Freud and Bataille demonstrates that the
metaphors of economy have proved to be as theoretically productive
as they are unavoidable. Indeed, as Bataille's discourse shows with
extraordinary power, it is the economic insistence on consumption at
the multiple and often interacting levels of theoretical economieseconomic, political, conceptual-that is most problematic. The
theoretical problem is a metaphoric loss of the economy of loss and
thus of the general economy.
It is not that consumption and the pleasure of consumption are
not important or theoretically and otherwise pleasurable. To reverse
the configuration absolutely and to privilege expenditure unconditionally would be just as untenable. As I indicated earlier, Bataille's
heavy insistence on waste and expenditure must be seen as
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problematic in this respect, and is "saved" only by the enormous
labyrinthine complexity of Bataille's inscription of these concepts.
A considerable portion of the third critique might be seen as
Kant's attempt at a science of this-non-economic-economy of the
poet or genius, represented best by the genius of poetry, which "of all
the arts . maintains the first rank." Or, closer to Bataille's terms,
one might speak of economy as the science of this operation of genius,
analogous to, but also different from, the sovereign operation as
conceived by Bataille, requiring a major form of writing and a general
rather than restricted economy as its science. Like Hegel's economy
of Absolute Knowledge, the economy inscribed in Kant, being an
economy of consumption, must still be seen as a restricted economy:
the science of the operation of mastery rather than the general
economy and sovereignty in Bataille. 8
One might feel a certain uneasiness with regard to the metaphoric
fusion, transfusion or, at times, a metaphoric confusion arising in
these labyrinths of "economic" inscription in Kant, Bataille and
Derrida. It is useful to keep in mind for clarity's sake that "economy"
in Bataille always designates a science, a theory: in the most significant case, that of the general economy. It is a science of the sovereign
operation, whereas in Derrida's reading of Kant, "economy"
designates an operation, an activity of genius. In general terms, however, particularly in those of general economy, the metaphorical transfusions of that type are as productive as they are inevitable. For it is
our economies as sciences or theories- accounts -that produce the
economies or operation we want to account for. The economic
metaphor of accounting is, in turn, not accidental in this context. It is
an accounting or calculation of certain operations, however endless or
interminable, that we want to inscribe as calculus and accounting of
the interminable and the indeterminable.
Hegel in making the philosophy of history into the history of
philosophy, already knew it quite well and was one of the first to
understand the depths and labyrinths of this problem that can only be
finally resolved at the level of the Absolute, that is to say, impossible
knowledge. Derrida, in commenting on the transgression of Hegel
enacted by Bataille's sovereignty, correctly points out the necessity of
this Hegelian moment: "Not that one returns, in classical and pre Hegelian fashion, to an ahistorical sense which would constitute a
figure of the Phenomenology of Mind. Sovereignty transgresses the
.

.
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entirety of the history of meaning and the entirety of the meaning of
history, and the project of knowledge which has always obscurely
welded these two together" ( Writing and Difference, p. 269). In his
essay, Derrida also speaks of "the rigorous and subtle corridors"
(p. 254) of dialectic. Quite so, yet corridors of dialectics are not the
labyrinths of the general economy. Life in the labyrinth may not be
easy; it is, however, preferable to life in a more comfortable corridor.
(Nobody any longer even dreams about rooms, let alone apartments
or houses. Well, some do.)
That is not to say, particularly given the labyrinths of our
theoretical household (in Greek, oikonomia, economy), that our
accounting will be able to comprehend everything- "to take everything into account." That would still be an illusion, however comfortable, a dialectical corridor-that is, a restricted economy, whether
political (as in Marx) or general, most general, conscious or
conceptual ( as in Hegel). Nobody understood this difference better
than Bataille. And we may think of the word difference here in either
sense: a difference between two economies of accounting, restricted
in general, and one between an economy and an operation that it
wants to account for. The most radical difference announced by
Bataille as he inscribes the general economy has to do with problematizing the possibility of an account and economy (as science or
theory), however conceived.9 This double (at least double) difference, therefore, this difference if you like, will affect enormously
and multiply the shape our "accounting" must take. In these regions
the category of choice must seem particularly trivial. 10
Kant's economic considerations imply a fundamental asymmetry between two economies at issue. One, "a mercenary employment," is the economy of exchange, actual or potential, including,
but not exclusively, a monetary exchange. We might call it an
"economic" economy. Another, a "non-economic" economy, the
economy of the beautiful art and genius, is conceived above all
through a radical prohibition of exchange. To be rigorous one should
speak of at least three economies here, for Kant also suggests a possibility of an exchange-reward economy at the conceptual level (in the
domain of understanding) as well, which the economy of the genius of
the beautiful arts escapes: "and again, though the mind is here
occupied, it feels itself thus contented and aroused without looking to
any other purpose (independent of reward)." There is a certain
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purpose and reward economy in the occupation (employment) of the
mind. But such is not the case in the employment classified as beautiful art.

This asymmetry is of fundamental significance in Kant, though it
cannot be sustained on Kant's grounds, as an absolute or fundamental distinction. It is not only that the economy of beautiful art
cannot be fully liberated from an exchange or reward of some sort. It
must be factored in, whether we inscribe the economy of the beautiful
or the economy of beautiful art. It might include, for example, an
exchange and reward for "the mind . . occupied" by a play of
imagination and feeling "thus contented and aroused without looking
to any other purpose (independently of reward)." As we have seen,
however, an unconditional insistence of this form of pleasurable
consumption must in turn be seen as problematic. Conditionally, this
consumption and this exchange must be taken into account. More significant is the impossibility of an "absolute" reduction of the mercenary or "economic" economy and employment to a definite standard or (paid) reward implied by Kant. As Bataille's analysis of
expenditure suggests, no economy of any kind can be unconditionally reduced either to an exchange economy or an economy absolutely free of exchange. "The Notion of Expenditure," for example,
powerfully inscribes the structural ( and structuring) supplement of
exchange. " Indeed, by insisting, in a certain proximity to Nietzsche,
on the exuberance of "exchange" and expenditure or on the exchange
of expenditures in that essay, Bataille's text problematizes quite
radically the concepts of expenditure and waste. Exuberant, the
operations involved there are always more than simply expenditure,
more than merely waste.
It does not mean that such reductions in either direction are not
found in theoretical practice, including in Bataille, who tends to subordinate the effects of exchange and consumption. What Bataille's
analysis demands, however, is a different inscription of the economic
and its efficacy. 12 Neither the structures of rewards, including at the
level of the monetary or political economy, nor the differences
between these various economies would disappear in this inscription.
How could they? Rather they must be inscribed otherwise, in effect
with an increased rigor, necessary precisely in order to account for the
multiplicity and richness of these differences. For in this enlarged difference of inscription one would no longer be able to speak either of
.
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one operation or parcel operations categorically in a demarcated
accountable set.
The crucial question that poses itself with regard to Bataille is
whether the difference between restricted and general economy, even
given the interaction between them, does not retain a kind of Kantian
(and thus also inescapably Hegelian) trace of absolute difference-a
trace not sufficiently erased or comprehended by Bataille. For a certain trace, given closure, will be unavoidable. This difference concerns not only an unconditional privilege or priority of expenditure
over consumption. It could be pointed out in this context that the difference and asymmetry so inscribed in Bataille can be seen either
as the difference between an economy of non-exchange-a noneconomic economy-and an exchange economy, or as the difference
between the economy of expenditure and the economy of consumption. Given Bataille's analysis of exchange (inscribed quite differently, precisely through expenditure) in "The Notion of Expenditure" and elsewhere, I would see the second possibility, the priority
and even idealization of waste, as more significant in Bataille's case.
A most important issue, however, is an unconditional privilege of the
general economy, however inscribed, or, in general, of any economy
over any other.
The labyrinth of this question is enormous and is in the end
intractable. That is, in the end it cannot be mapped once and for all.
What I want to do in this paper is rather to articulate the differences
between Bataille and Kant, whose significance will be undiminished
whatever the answer and will enable us to inscribe the difference
(radical enough) from Kant and Hegel. The answer, it might be said, is
important only with respect to the question of inscribing or situating
Bataille's "own" text. In general theoretical terms, one might say that
there is no question here. No economy of any kind might be seen so
unconditionally privileged. Such is, for now at least (that is, at this
particular moment in the history of theory and, of course, for specific
theorists so implied) the law of the economy of the theoretical.
Such is the constraint of the conditional. But then again, we cannot
unconditionally separate the question of theory and the question of
Bataille, particularly the question of situating Bataille's own text
historically.
With the qualifications elaborated earlier, the differences
between Kant and Bataille might be subsumed under two interactive
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rubrics: the differences in the inscriptions of the economic operation,
and the differences in respective sciences or accounts of the operation. It is useful to recall Bataille's own formulation of this economic
problematics in L'Experience interieure before proceeding to an articulation of these differences:
The science of relating the object to sovereign moments, in fact,
is only a general economy which envisages the meaning of these
objects in relation to each other and finally in relation to the loss
of meaning. The question of this general economy is situated at
the level ofpolitical economy, but the science designated by this
name is only a restricted economy (restricted to commercial
values). In question is the essential problem for the science
dealing with the use of wealth. The general economy, in the first
place, makes apparent that excesses of energy are produced, and
that by definition these excesses cannot be utilized. The excessive energy can only be lost without the slightest aim, consequently without any meaning. It is this useless, senseless loss that
is sovereignty."

Whatever differences Kant inscribes, first in the aesthetic
economy (either as the economy of the beautiful or of the sublime),
and secondly in the economy of the genius of beautiful art, it always
remains an economy of consumption (as Kant's metaphor taste
indicates), and, indeed, the economy of pleasurable consumption.
Furthermore, in the case of the beautiful art, it remains the economy
of consumption of meaning. For, as we recall, "[the poet] provides in
this play [of ideas] food for the understanding" (Kant, p. 165). This is
why one must rigorously insist on the difference between the economy
of the beautiful and the economy ofbeautiful art; as the latter includes
the former, it also exceeds the aesthetic economy of beautiful feeling
by a philosophical (though still inscribed through consumption)
dimension of understanding. As Kant maintains, "For beautiful art,
therefore, imagination, understanding, spirit, and taste are requisite"
(p. 164).

As in Aristotle and in the tradition he initiated, after the initial
demarcation of art by its difference, specifically in affecting feeling
and the feeling of pleasure, the value of art will be established on the
basis of philosophical criteria of one type or another. Poetry, for
example, is more philosophical than history is in Aristotle or than
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rhetoric is in Kant. An account of this difference still remains within
the domain and power of the philosophical explanation, and making
poetry "more philosophical" might be necessary precisely to maintain this parergon, maintain it by identifying the difference that in part
establishes its boundaries. It can be shown, however, that neither
Aristotle nor Kant will be able to sustain the boundaries and parergon at issue. From within their own discourse (this is, of course, what
makes the configuration so interesting), poetry and art can be shown
to exceed the containment of the philosophical account in Aristotle
and Kant.
The inscription of the philosophical into the poetic is, in Kant,
non-trivial enough. It should be recalled that Kant's opposition (and
thus a certain excess) is set between the orator and the poet rather than
between the philosopher and the poet, as this opposition must be,
given the philosophical nature of aesthetic value in Kant. The orator,
of course, also gives more than he promises, just as the poet does; "the
orator therefore gives something that he does not promise, viz. an
entertaining play of imagination." There is a difference, however,
indeed a crucial difference for the orator "also fails to supply what he
did promise, which is indeed his announced business, viz. the purposive occupation of the understanding" (p. 165). That, according
to Kant's division of intellectual labor, will be supplied by the
philosopher. The orator thus fails because he in fact entertains, rather
than conducting "a promised serious business." The poet's
(announced) entertainment, in contrast, "has the same effect upon the
understanding, as if he had only intended to carry on its business"
(p. 165), its serious, that is its philosophical, business. Beautiful art,
particularly poetry, in contrast to the experience of the beautiful, is
bound to be philosophical.
Given these corridors of the economy of taste, Kant's division of
the beautiful arts that gives poetry priority over rhetoric is inevitable,
even though both are arts of speech that are related to the mouth, the
organ of both taste and speech. This priority of voice and the
hierarchies of arts and senses it entails are exhaustively analyzed by
Derrida in "Economimesis." It might be further pointed out that the
poet as discussed in the passage at issue and the genius of the beautiful art in the third critique in general are inscribed so as to efface in the
end the material substance produced by the mouth or the phonetic
substance, to make it disappear in fully internalized play. The immediate proximity-presence-of "voice" to "mind" finally allows one
Published by New Prairie Press
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to dwell in the absolute presence of mind and ideas. The "speech" and
"voice" of poetry become thus "the art of mind" similar to the internal self-present speech of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.14 Husserl's dependence on Kant in general is, of course,
huge. In the context of the present discussion, however, Husserl
writes in one of his very rare specific references to art:

It is naturally important, on the other hand (once again as in
geometry, which has recently and not idly been attaching great
value to collections of models and the like), to make rich use of
fancy in that service of perfect clearness which we are here
demanding, to use it in the free transformation of the data of
fancy, but previously also to fructify it through the richest and
best observations possible in primordial intuition; noting, of
course, that this fructifying does not imply that experience as
such can be the ground of validity. We can draw extraordinary
profit from what history has to offer us, and in still richer measure
from the gifts of art and particularly of poetry. These are indeed
fruits of imagination, but in respect of the originality of the new
formations, of the abundance of detailed features, and the
systematic continuity of the motive forces involved, they greatly
excel the performances of our own fancy, and moreover, given
the understanding grasp, pass through the suggestive power of the
media of artistic presentation with quite special ease into perfectly clear fancies.
Hence, if anyone loves a paradox, he can really say, and say
with strict truth if he will allow for the ambiguity, that the element which makes up the life of phenomenology as of all
eidetical science is 'fiction, "that fiction is the source whence the
knowledge of "eternal truths" draws its sustenance. "

As the foregoing discussion would suggest, the presence of Kant here
is mighty. The insistence on poetry is particularly revealing, though it
is also necessary, given the privileged role of voice and phonetic substance in their immediate proximity to mind, the "voice that keeps
silence," in Husserl. What is most interesting, however, is the question of profit or even extraordinary profit in Husserl's formulation.
The philosopher "can draw extraordinary profit from what history
has to offer [him], and in still richer measure from the gifts of art and
particularly of poetry" (p. 184). The philosopher's desire to consume
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol12/iss2/5
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and to take full economic advantage of both history and art (particularly poetry) is irrepressible. But it is the consumptive desire-the
appetite of the philosopher-that would inscribe the philosophical
into the arts in the first place in order to make it ready for philosophical
consumption.
Here we might expect a burst of laughter from Bataille. First of
all, the surrealistic Bataille would laugh at the possibility of pleasure
and of the pleasure of consumption without displeasure or even
without disgust-taste without dis-taste, gout without degofit. It
should be pointed out at this juncture that, as Derrida shows in
"Economimesis," it is not that the economy ofdis-gust goes unnoticed
or is discounted. It is philosophically accounted for, but is not on that
account part of the economy of taste. In a singularly bad theoretical
taste it is accounted for precisely as dis-gust, dis-taste, as what does
not belong. A more significant issue however, in Bataille's context, is
the more general conceptual or metaphoric structure of the Kantian
economy and Kantian economimesis as economy and mimesis of
consumption. It is this, whether in Kant or Hegel, that would be
unacceptable or laughable to Bataille. "Waste and taste" might
occupy separate compartments in the corridors of dialectic or
philosophy in general, but they are ultimately and intimately related
in the labyrinths of the general economy. That would also refer to the
general economy of Bataille's own life, where the inscription of
production-philosophical, sociological, artistic or other-must have
been multiply related by Bataille himself to the economy of waste,
including the inscription of the difference between consummation and
consumption and to the unreserved expenditure of tuberculosis,
Bataille's disease, consomption, that consumes-that is, wasteswithout the slightest aim, consequently without any meaning.
It must be kept in mind, however, that the general economy-as
the economy of loss, waste, expenditure without reserve, and so onand the operations it aims to account for cannot be reduced to
the economy of disgust exemplified by Derrida's analysis in
"Economimesis" of "disgust" and "vomiting" in Kant. The loss and
expenditure enacted by Bataille's sovereign operation and inscribed
in the general economy as the science of sovereignty are enormously
rich and complex structures. Their inscription includes, for example,
the conceptions of "gift" and "sacrifice" (analyzed at great length by
Bataille) and a formidable array of other structures that must be considered with utmost rigor and precision.
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"Vomiting," however, remains important in the context of
general economy as an exemplification of the absolute dis-gust, something that cannot be consumed, has to be "thrown up." Or must it be?
Certainly by definition, it cannot be in Kant; this is Derrida's major
point in "Economimesis." In general, however, in the general
economy, things are not so simple or restricted, threatening the whole
Kantian or the philosophical scheme of taste, and in every sense
conceivable making the issue into a labyrinth-maze-populated
with all sorts of monsters. The question of vomiting has, of course, its
place in Bataille, a very definite place in a memorable quotation from
Sade in a great and important essay, entitled, quite pertinently, "The
Use Value of D. A. F. de Sade." As Bataille writes, quoting Sade:
The process of simple appropriation is normally presented within
the process of composite excretion, insofar as it is necessary for
the production of an alternating rhythm, for example, in the
following passage from Sade: "Verneiul makes someone shit, he
eats the turd, and then he demands that someone eats his. The
one who eats his shit vomits; he devours her puke. ( Visions p. 95)

The pleasures
might be seen as monstrous enough, but they must be accounted for as
what Derrida calls in "Signature Event Context" "a structural
possibility," even if they would occur only once, and they have, in
fact, certainly occurred more than once. In a certain sense, they occur
all the time; not necessarily in the specific shape described by Sade,
but as analogous effects of the general economy of "taste" that
must incorporate "dis-taste" and "dis-gust" as its ineluctable
constituent.
As Derrida shows it is only in the Kantian economy of taste as an
economy of pleasurable consumption that the question of vomiting
and disgust must acquire and be philosophically accounted for as
having a unique position, from which the whole scheme might thus be
deconstructed. This special position precisely allows and invites a
critical scrutiny and deconstruction. Once such a deconstruction is
performed and the economy of taste is re-inscribed as the general
economy, "vomiting" and "disgust" become regular effects of this
enriched economy, though they might under certain conditions have
asymmetrical relations and be subordinated by the effects of taste and
consumption.
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By the same token the general economy cannot be seen as only
the economy of loss, waste, unreserved expenditure and so on. It can
never be unconditionally separated from the restricted economy in the
first place. Both "taste" and "disgust" are in fact still restricted effects
of the complex labyrinth of the general economy; this, perhaps, was
also Derrida's point in "Economimesis." Bataille, in the essay at
issue, in inscribing this complexity, brilliantly relates Sade's passage
to the question of sacrifice, communion, gift, general expenditure, and
so forth, thus establishing the affects of disgust precisely as a
manifestation, however extreme, of the general rather than of the
exclusive, as philosophy would want to do.
It is because philosophy or traditional theory have throughout
their history (with some notable exceptions, such as Sade or
Nietzsche) suppressed and/or repressed the economy of expenditure
that the expenditure must be brought into the foreground, but not
because it has the absolute privilege over the economy of consumption. The latter economy (as science) must now be made general as
well, that is, to take into account (or dis-count) and reinscribe a
consumption and production as an effect of expenditure and
unreserved expenditure. Since the restricted economy manifests
itself, above all, at the level of the political economy, these consequences and implications are the value (it can no longer quite be
called the use-value) of D. A. F. de Sade, the value brilliantly
exposed in Bataille's "Open Letter to My Current Comrades," as his
essay is subtitled. The political economy as the economy of the
political must take the effects inscribed by de Sade into consideration, not an "account" perhaps.
Conversely, the economy ofthe sexual must take into account the
effects and the very economy of the political. The relationships
between these two economies should not be seen as always
necessarily symmetrical. To begin with, there are more than two
economies involved here. The hypothesis that such economies form a
countable set is hardly tenable, though there will certainly be multiple "set-effects" in our economic calculations, in our calculus and our
accounting, of these interactions.
Derrida's extraordinary analysis of Kant in "Economimesis"
depends fundamentally on Bataille's conceptions. It opens by introducing (in Bataille's sense) the concept of "economimesis" in the context of relationships between the restricted and general economies, or
rather referring to Bataille's terms from infinitesimal to radical,
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including (as in the case of the difference between Derrida's differance and Hegel's Aufhebung) both at once. 16 As Derrida writes:
It would appear that mimesis and oikonomia could have nothing
to do with one another. The point is to demonstrate the contrary,
to exhibit the systematic link between the two; but not between
some particular political economy and mimesis, for the latter can
accommodate itself to political systems that are different, even
opposed to one another. And we are not yet defining economy as
an economy of circulation (a restricted economy) or a general
economy, for the whole difficulty is narrowed down here as soon
as-that is the hypothesis-there is no possible opposition
between these two economies. Their relation must be one neither
of identity nor of contradiction but must be other. (pp. 3-4)

The two sections into which Derrida divides his essay-"Production
as Mimesis" and "Exemporality"-might be seen as demarcating the
problems involved along two lines or rubrics indicated earlier. The
first section explores the nature or the structure of the operation,
inscribing the economy of mimesis as a mimesis of the economy. The
second could be seen as a critique of an attempt at the philosophical,
conceptual account of both the economy of the beautiful and the
economy of beautiful art. These two economies, as we recall, remain
interactive in Kant, but their difference is also rigorously maintained
in the third critique. Since I have considered the structure of the
economic operation and the role of the difference between consumption and expenditure in some detail earlier, I would like to conclude
with some remarks on the nature of the account, that is to say, precisely with the question of the general economy as science in Derrida
and Bataille. It must still be kept in mind that these two issues"operation" and "its science"-remain in a complex interaction as
indicated earlier.
Derrida, in his account of the Kantian or even philosophical in
general, seems in the essay at issue to stress the "desire" of the system
to account for its other, specifically the system of the beautiful for the
(absolute) dis-gust. The issue, clearly enough, is more general. It is
the issue and account of the other ofthe system. The other, as the term
and concept of the other, is in fact already an account ofthe other, and
"vomit" takes in Kant a specific, privileged role in this configuration.
As Derrida writes at the conclusion of "Economimesis":
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Disgust is not the symmetrical inverse of taste, the negative key
to the system, except insofar as some interest sustains its
excellence, like that of the mouth itself-the chemistry of the
word-and prohibits the substitution of any non-oral analogue.
The system therefore is interested in determining the other as its
other, that is, as literary disgust.
What is absolutely foreclosed is not vomit, but the
possibility of a vicariousness of vomit, of its replacement by
anything else-by some other unrepresentable, unnameable,
unintelligible, insensible, unassimilable, obscene other which
forces enjoyment and whose irrepressible violence would undo
the hierarchizing authority of logocentric analogy-its power of
identification. . . .
The word vomit arrests the vicariousness of disgust; it puts
the thing in the mouth; it substitutes; but only, for example, oral
for anal. It is determined by the system of the beautiful, "the
symbol of morality," as its other. It is then for philosophy, still, an
elixir, even in the quintessence of its bad taste. (p. 25; emphasis
on "anal" added)
in Bataille's
We have
inscription of the interplay between consumption and expenditure,
including the substitution, not by analogy only; of oral for anal. Both
Bataille and Derrida make quite apparent the folly and "naïveté" of
this powerful and irrepressible desire to exclude. The latter is itself a
gesture of rejection and not consumption; a rejected (repressed) rejection makes its powerful return, the return of the repressed into the
structure of the philosophical that is, consumptive) account. Derrida
thus inserts in the passage just cited:

Vicariousness would in turn be reassuring only if it substituted an identifiable term for an unrepresentable one, if it allowed
one to step aside from the abyss in the direction of another place,
if it were interested in some other go-around [s'interesse
quelque mange] But for that it would have to be itself and represent itself as such. Whereas it is starting from that impossibility
that economimesis is constrained in its processes.
This impossibility cannot be said to be some thing, something sensible or intelligible, that could fall under one or the other
senses or under some concept. One cannot name it within the
.
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logocentric system-within the name-which in turn can only
vomit it and vomit itself in it. One cannot even say: what is it?
That would be to begin to eat it, or-what is no longer absolutely
different-to vomit it. The question what is? already parleys
[arraisonne] like a parergon, it constructs a framework which
captures the energy of what is complete inassimilable and absolutely repressed. Any philosophical question already determines, concerning this other, a paregoric parergon. A paregoric
remedy softens with speech; it consoles, it exhorts with the word.
As its name indicates. (p. 25)

This question of the excluded (the most general logic of philosophy,
perhaps logic itself) and paregoric remedy of parergon would, however, constitute only a part, however indispensable and however
structuring, of the inscription of the general economy as science, in
both Derrida and Bataille. Bataille's greatest laughter comes as he
looks at the naïveté of the philosopher accounting for beautiful art.
The very term beautiful would be laughable enough. Bataille's
laughter would in fact be most "logical" here. The philosophical (conscious and conceptual) accounts and the science of philosophy (such
as Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, subtitled "The Science
[Wissenschaft] of the Experience of Consciousness") are, by definition, consumptive, and thus remain a restricted economy. As Derrida
notes in "From Restricted to General Economy," such a restricted
philosophical economy would "pleasurably consume an absolutely
close presence" (Writing and Difference, p. 273).
The philosopher, it is true, often "forgets" this pleasure of the
conceptual consumption and conceptual mastery. The "forgetting"
may take the form of either unconscious repressing or conscious
concealment or various combinations of both) of the knowledge of this
pleasure. It has been around ever since Socrates based the difference
between and opposition of philosophy and literature on the difference
and opposition between truth and pleasure. Once the philosophical
discourse "pleasurably consumes," however, would not the
framing-the parergon-that divides the philosophical and the
literary or artistic be threatened in its very core? This parergon also
fundamentally divides that which accounts (namely, philosophy), and
the experience of the beautiful and beautiful art, that are accounted for
by a philosopher. Derrida's analysis of Kant in "Economimesis" and
La verite en peinture suggests at least that much. Cannot, then, the
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third critique, an account that pleasurably consumes, be itself read as
an aesthetic experience or as a work of beautiful art? The latter parergon is already to some extent violated in Kant's own text, as it is in
Aristotle, by establishing the fundamentally philosophical value of
the beautiful art of the highest rank, poetry. The parergonal violation
inscribed in the questions just asked is of a more radical, more violent
and, in theoretical terms, more fundamental nature.
First of all, the economy of such an "aesthetic" account, an
account as beautiful art, must, according to both Bataille and Derrida,
exceed the economy of consumption, that is, the restricted economy
to which both philosophy and beautiful art conform in Kant. It is precisely a belief, a "naive" or "vulgar" (that is to say "philosophical")
belief, in the possibility of the utilization of all intellectual energy that
Bataille laughs at. For the philosopher can only believe or claim
to take everything into his account or into his dis-count, but not
"actually" do so. The economy of every account-literary, philosophical or other-is always already a general economy.
Still more significant is the question of the law or the style of a
discourse in the general economy and of major writing. It would be
most naive or vulgar to reverse the configuration-to reverse the
parergon-and replace philosophy or theory, make literature or the
"beautiful art" into a unique or ultimate genre of general economy.
The latter, as we recall, still remains a science, though, to be sure, in
neither a Hegelian nor a positivist sense; it is not a "positive science."
But it must retain a scientific rigor in its discourse. Like Nietzsche,
Bataille practiced a plural style and plural genre in his own discourse,
making it both literary (in his novels or poetry) and theoretical (in his
essays). But he also attempted something else in his activities related
to the College de Sociologie. One must then speak of at least three
genres for enacting a general economy of discourse and major form of
writing. It must be pointed out that one must be rather cautious in
relating the general economy and major writing in Bataille. Bataille,
let us further recall, was also a librarian and the founder and editor of
the journal Critique. Since in all of these "genres" or "styles," the
social or general political economy are heavily involved, what is most
at stake (en jeu) in the question of general economy is the law and the
style of the social and institutional forms of our accounts. And this
law and this style, or this genre, cannot (and in practice should not) be
established once and for all, though some claim to have done so. As
Derrida writes, "referring to the entire French landscape" (in
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1968), where Bataille is inescapably present: "What we need, perhaps, as Nietzsche said, is a change of `style'; and if there is style,
Nietzsche reminded us, it must be plural" (Margins, p. 135).
Bataille, however, in Derrida's own words, "considered himself
closer to Nietzsche than anyone else, to the point of identification with
him" ( Writing and Difference, p. 251), most of all, in the force of the
impact, in the radical transformation of the "theoretical" or "literary"
style, in making it plural. It is the maze of style and the style of a maze.
"NIETZSCHE'S DOCTRINE CANNOT BE ENSLAVED. It
can only be followed" (Visions, p. 184), a thought and stylewriting-that must be entered like a labyrinth. In a brilliant little
chapter "Nietzsche/Theseus" of "The Obelisk", Bataille, anticipating much of deconstruction, invokes "a derisive and enigmatic figure
placed at the entrance of the labyrinth" and speaks of "the foundation of things that has fallen into a bottomless void. And what is fearlessly assented to no longer in a duel where the death of the hero is
risked against that of the monster, in exchange for an indifferent
duration-is not an isolated creature; it is the very void and vertiginous fall, it is TIME" ( Visions, p. 222). No wonder that Kant, in
contemplating the beautiful, prefers tulips in the garden to the vertiginous and even nauseating experience of the labyrinth. We must
say, in all fairness to Kant, that he approaches some of this vertiginous experience in his analysis of the sublime, and thus can be seen
as a precursor of both Nietzsche and Bataille (as well as Sade) in this
respect. But then the whole opposition between the beautiful (the one
that is framed, in a parergon) and the sublime (the one-"absolutely
great"-that exceeds all parerga) collapses. It is also a collapse of the
philosophical style.
It is not that in so recognizing Bataille's enormous contribution
one would want to claim for Bataille, or Nietzsche, or indeed anyone,
a unique significance in this transformation of the theoretical field.
Rather, in an account that, in an absence of a better word might still
be termed "historical," one would want to explore in a stratified
ensemble-from Kant and Hegel, to Nietzsche, Bataille and
Derrida-what has made and still makes possible the radical transformations of the field, the transformations that make the field plural.
And in thinking of the theorists and practitioners of the plural style,
one will have to refer to a landscape that can no longer be demarcated
as either French or German, however important these two landscapes
might be. Like style, if there is landscape, it must be plural.
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NOTES

1. In Georges Bataille, Visions ofExcess, ed. Allan Stoekl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), p. 35.
2. Derrida defines the "historical and systematic unity" of this closure in Positions,
trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981). He writes:
Don't you see, what has seemed necessary and urgent to me, in the historical and
theoretical situation which is our own, is a general determination of the conditions for the emergence and the limits of philosophy, of metaphysics, of everything that carries it on and that it carries on. In Of Grammatology I simultaneously proposed everything that can be reassembled under the rubric of
logocentrism- and I cannot pursue this any further here-along with the project
of deconstruction. Here, there is a powerful historical and systematic unity that
must be determined first if one is not to take dross for gold every time that an
emergence, rupture, break, mutation, etc. is allegedly delineated. (p. 51)
One of Derrida's major points, however, regarding this "historical and systematic
unity," the point defining the closure, is that, operating at "the limits of philosophy,"
deconstruction does not imply an absolute and unconditional break with the language
and concepts of philosophy, and the structures, such as &Prance, trace, and so on, can
only be defined or rather inscribed within this closure. In fact even an absolute break is
impossible, and particularly, when such a break is claimed. Deconstruction, therefore,
must take place utilizing the resources of philosophy: "And this in no way minimizes
the necessity and relative importance of certain breaks, of the appearance and definition of new structures" (p. 24). As I shall consider below, the forms-the style-of discourse where such structures can be inscribed themselves become a crucial issue in the
context of Bataille and Derrida's reading of Bataille. See also Derrida's comments on
pp. 6-7. As all these statements indicate, the problematic of closure permeates
Derrida's project throughout.
3. The term "parergon" functions in this sense of deconstruction and reinscription of
the classical notion of framing, boundaries, margins, and so on, in Derrida's analysis
of Kant in: La verite en peinture (Paris: Aubier-Flammarion, 1978), and
"E conomimesis," Mimesis des Articulations (Paris: Aubier-Flammarion, 1975),
reprinted in English translation in Diacritics, 11, No. 3 (1981), 25. The word "parergon" itself initially occurs in Section 14 of Kant's The Critique Judgment, trans. J. H.
Bernard (New York: Hafner Press, 1951), defining "those things that do not belong to
the complete representation of the object internally as elements, but only externally as
complements" (p. 61). It thus invites the deconstruction of the whole Kantian scheme
of taste.
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4. See Derrida's discussion in "Signature Event Context" in Margins of
Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), and
Derrida's subsequent reply to Searle "Limited Inc., abc," Glyph, 2 (1977). 162-254.
"Signature Event Context" was originally published in French in 1972 and then in
English translation in Glyph, (1976). 172-97.
5. Derrida, "From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without
Reserve," Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1978), p. 263.
6. Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri C. Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 164.
7. Immanuel Kant. Critique ofJudgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner
Press, 1951). pp. 165-66.
8. See Derrida's analysis in "From Restricted to General Economy," Writing and
Difference, pp. 274-75.
9. It might in fact be seen as the major theme of Derrida's reading of both Bataille and
Kant.
10. Derrida, Writing and Difference, p. 293.
11. See specifically the discussion in Visions, pp. 116-29.
12. As Derrida suggests, ". . we must interpret Bataille against Bataille, or rather,
must interpret one stratum of his work from another" ( Writing and Difference, p. 275).
Derrida supplies a long and extremely important footnote to this statement, containing
one of his rare, but perhaps so much more significant references to Sartre.
13. L'Experience interieure (Paris: Gallimard, 1967). Cited by Derrida in "From
Restricted to General Economy," Writing and Difference, p. 270. For a general
critical introduction to these issues and Bataille's major concepts see Michele H.
Richman's Reading George Bataille; Beyond the GUI (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1982).
14. See Derrida's critique in Speech and Phenomena, trans. David Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
15. Husserl, Ideas, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier Books, 1972),
1

.

p. 184.

16. See Derrida's comment in "Differance" (Margins, p. 14).
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